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The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea: A "Midstream" Assessment
of the Effectiveness of Article 309
JOHN KING GAMBLE, Jr.*
The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea worked for more
than a decade, producing in 1982 the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea. An important aspect of that treaty is the
stand taken on reservations. Article 309 prohibits all reservations,
while article 310 permits declarations and statements provided
these do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of the
Convention. This Article examines all declarations to determine if
the letter and spirit of articles 309 and 310 are being met. Fur-
ther, some observations are offered about the effects of article 309
on participation levels in the treaty.
INTRODUCTION
Reservations to multilateral treaties have become a fixture of in-
ternational law as it has developed in this century. At first blush, the
number of reservations seems enormous. At least 1500 reservations
have been offered to multilateral treaties since World War 1.1 This
record, however, is not nearly so disturbing when considered in the
context of the total number of multilateral treaties:
Overall, there are no reservations at all to 85 percent of multilateral trea-
ties, and more than three to only 4 percent of such treaties. From the per-
spective of the state itself, the average since World War II is about one
* Professor of Political Science, The Behrend College, Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity. M.A. 1969, Ph.D. 1971, University of Washington.
1. Gamble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372, 380
(1980).
reservation per state every 5 years . . . The attempt at categorizing sug-
gests that fully 70 percent [of reservations] cannot under any circumstances
have a seriously negative impact on the treaty.2
It has long been recognized that reservations are a two-edged
sword. On the one hand, a lenient stance on the use of reservations
will make it easier for states to become parties and probably will
bring wider participation.3 Conversely, if reservations are permitted
without restriction, eventually the treaty may begin to unravel. The
International Law Commission put the matter this way:
[I]t may often be more important to maintain the integrity of a convention
than to aim, at any price, at the widest possible acceptance of it. A reserv-
ing State proposes, in effect, to insert into a convention a provision which
will exempt that State from certain of the consequences which would other-
wise devolve upon it from the convention, while leaving the other States
which are or may become parties to it fully subject to those consequences in
their relations inter se."
However, the modal view seems to be that reservations are a nec-
essary part of international law. They can be messy and inconve-
nient, but they are part of the price- that must be paid for living in
an imperfect world. Given this climate, it is not surprising that very
few treaties contain a blanket prohibition of reservations.5 Thus, it is
noteworthy when an important convention does precisely that: per-
mits no reservations. This is the stance taken by the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention or the
2. Id. at 392.
3. For an excellent discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of treaty res-
ervations, see Knight, The Potential Use of Reservations to International Agreements
Produced by the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, PoL'Y ISSUES IN OCEAN
L. 1-8 (1975).
4. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,[1951] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 128, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.l.
5. In a recent study, I compared the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention with nine
other important treaties that attempt to regulate the use of territory. This analysis in-
cluded the following treaties: Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No.
5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61
Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295; Convention on Transit Trade of Land-
Locked States, done July 8, 1965, 19 U.S.T. 7383, T.I.A.S. No. 6592, 597 U.N.T.S. 3;
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205;
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons
of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, done Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T.
701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 0; 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of
State on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [not yet in force]. None of these treaties
takes the stand of the 1982 LOS Convention, i.e., a blanket, explicit prohibition on all
reservations. See Gamble, The International Law of the Sea of the 1980s: The Excep-
tion, the Rule or the Trigger? 9 Hous. J. INT'L L. 801 (1987).
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Convention) . The LOS Convention states in unequivocal language:
"[n]o reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention un-
less expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention." 7
Some maneuvering room, however, may have been provided.
When signing, ratifying or acceding to the LOS convention, a state
may make declarations or statements in an attempt to harmonize
"its laws and regulations with the provisions of [the] Convention,
provided that such declarations or statements do not purport to ex-
clude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of [the] Conven-
tion in their application to that State."8
The LOS Convention was opened for signature on December 10,
1982, and remained open for two years.9 Although the Convention to
date has collected only half of the sixty parties required for entry
into force,10 some tentative observations may be offered about the
operation of articles 309 and 310. Two distinct aspects to this ques-
tion exist. The first is whether participation in the Convention has
been reduced by states' inability to make reservations. It is possible
to speculate about this issue by examining the number of parties and
the pronouncements of states about the effect of the prohibition. But
there is no precise way to obtain an accurate assessment of the effect
of article 309 on participation levels. The second, and more research-
able, question is whether "the declarations and statements" made so
far are really reservations in disguise. The balance of this Article
will consist of a few observations about the former question and a
detailed assessment of the latter.
EFFECTS ON PARTICIPATION LEVELS
As stated earlier, ascertaining the exact effect article 309 will
have on participation levels is impossible. The dominant initial im-
6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter LOS Conven-
tion]. The LOS Convention, the Final Act and other usual documents are contained in
THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX, FINAL ACT OF THE 3RD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA, INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL ON THE CONVENTION AND THE CONFERENCE(1983) [hereinafter OFFICIAL TEXT].
7. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 309. The wording adopted here is inter-
esting. The Convention never expressly permits reservations; this language may be a rem-
nant from earlier drafts. Alternatively, it might be argued that this applies to dispute
settlement provisions, some of which may be avoided.
8. Id. art. 310.
9. Id. art. 305; OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 6, at xix.
10. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 308.
pression is that article 309 was not of major concern at the LOS
Convention. During the signing ceremony in Montego Bay, Jamaica,
Bernardo Zuleta, special representative of the United Nations Secre-
tary General, Javier Perez de Cueller, and Tommy T. B. Koh, Presi-
dent of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
each made eloquent speeches designed, in essence, to highlight the
successes of the Conference and to push for rapid acceptance of the
treaty. Only Ambassador Koh's remarks touched the reservation is-
sue and did so rather gently: "My final point is addressed to those
who intend to make declarations under article 310. I would simply
remind them that such declarations should not purport to exclude or
modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in their
application to that State."'" Mr. Koh mentioned the prohibition on
reservations about as subtly as possible. Further, when Ambassador
Koh made essentially the same points for an official United Nations
publication, no mention of this issue was made. 2
Before analyzing formal understandings and declarations made by
states when signing or ratifying the LOS Convention, it is instructive
to examine some of the statements made during the signing cere-
mony. While these often are informal and have no legal significance
unless they are repeated as formal declarations, the statements do
give some indication of the probable effect of article 309 on partici-
pation levels. The spokesman for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re-
public (Ukrainian S.S.R.) made the following points:
Therefore, we are going to object categorically to the proposals aimed at
amending by any pretext the provisions of the Conventions and related reso-
lutions of the Conference . . .Our delegation would like to note at the
same time that in signing the Convention the Ukrainian S.S.R. will abstain
from the declarations provided for in Article 310 of the Convention. We
expect the same approach from other delegations.13
This position, surely reflective of Soviet policy, seems to anticipate
abuse of article 310. Interestingly, socialist states are among the
most active users - some would say excessively so - of reservations
to their multilateral treaties.' 4 Thus, the above statement marks ei-
ther a change in Soviet policy or an attempt to gain political advan-
tage without any intention of ratifying the treaty.
In its remarks, the Government of India seemed to be hinting at a
reservation-like position. 5 In contrast to the Indian position, the
11. Statement by Tommy T.B. Koh, U.N. Press Release SEA/MB/I/Rev.I,
Dec. 6, 1982, at 6 (emphasis added).
12. OFFICIAL TEXT, supra note 6, at xxxiii-xxxvii.
13. Statement by V.N. Martynenko, Chairman of the Ukrainian S.S.R. Delega-
tion, made at the LOS Convention Plenary Session of Dec. 7, 1982, at 3.
14. Gamble, supra note I, at 381-83.
15. Statement by J.N. Kaushal, Chairman of the Indian Delegation, made at the
LOS Convention Plenary Session of Dec. 7, 1982, at 6 [hereinafter Indian Statement].
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Netherlands expressed a willingness to take the good with the bad
because, on balance, the Convention was judged to be in the Dutch
national interest.16 One would not expect the Dutch, upon ratifica-
tion, to offer a reservation disguised in declaration's clothing. The
tone of the Indian statement - "such distinction is neither logical
nor justified" 17 - leads one to conclude that India is unsure that the
balance is acceptable. The statement by the People's Republic of
China seems to fall between the Indian and Dutch statements -
China is going to sign, but seems adamant in its objection to certain
provisions:
[T]here were no clear provisions regarding the regime of the passage of
foreign warships through territorial sea .... It should also be pointed out
that 'Resolution II' . . . has done too much in the way of meeting the de-
mands of a few industrial nations and given them and their companies some
privileges and priorities."'
One issue surrounding these informal statements concerns the
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom indicated that certain state-
ments made about the status of the Exclusive Economic Zone "ap-
pear to be in conflict with article 310, in that they purport to modify
the effect of the Convention's provisions."19 The British position
seems presumptuous - as a nonsignatory, the United Kingdom has
no right to object to the declarations of other states.2 0 In many ways,
the statements made by the United States are the litmus test, since
the decision by the United States neither to sign nor ratify was the
most important single event at the end of the Conference. One might
expect the United States to have made some mention of article 309,
perhaps saying that a less rigid requirement would have made it pos-
sible (or more likely) for it to sign. No mention whatsoever was
made of the reservation issue.21
What can one conclude from this? Has participation been reduced
by article 309? Surely if participation is measured by signatures, it
16. Statement by W. Riphagen, Head of the Netherlands Delegation, made at
the LOS Convention Plenary Session of Dec. 7, 1982, at 2.
17. Indian Statement, supra note 15, at 6.
18. Statement by Han Xu, Head of the Chinese Delegation, made at the LOS
Convention Plenary Session of Dec. 9, 1982, at 3.
19. Statement by J.B. Powell-Jones, Head of the United Kingdom Delegation,
made at the LOS Convention Plenary Session of Dec. 8, 1982, at 2.
20. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27,
arts. 20 & 21, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). All rights and duties attendant
with objections to reservations apply only to signatories to the treaty which, of course,
would not apply to the United Kingdom.
21. See Statement by the Head of the United States Delegation, made at the
LOS Convention Final Plenary Session of Dec. 9, 1982.
hardly could have been expanded. The final United Nations figures
show that 155 states have signed - there are very few holdouts.22
But one could argue that the real rub may come with ratification. As
this behemothian treaty continues to navigate the internal political
processes of states, article 309 may have a more significant impact.
It is possible that the rather slow accumulation of ratifications23 is
due in part to this issue.
ASSESSING THE DECLARATIONS
It hardly can be overemphasized that the ultimate success or fail-
ure of articles 309 and 310 cannot be judged for some time. What
follows is nothing more than a "midstream" assessment, so charac-
terized because the LOS Convention now has amassed about half
the parties required for entry into force. An earlier, and hence neces-
sarily more tentative, work was prepared by Daniel Vignes.2 4 Profes-
sor Vignes first divides declarations into two broad categories, "gen-
eral" and "particular," somewhat similar to the categories used by
the United Nations.25 He discovered four types of general declara-
tions: (1) those dealing with compatibility with national legislation;26
(2) those asserting that signature does not prejudice future actions,
for example, stand on ratification or existing treaties;27 (3) those
dealing with nonrecognition, often directed against the State of
Israel; 28 and (4) those dealing with rights created under the LOS
Convention, often stating that these rights will be applied only on a
reciprocal basis.29
Professor Vignes subdivided particular declarations according to
the relevant portion of the LOS Convention.3 0 He finds declarations
relative to most parts of the treaty, including innocent passage,31
straits,3 2 archipelagoes,3 3 the Exclusive Economic Zone,3 4 the conti-
22. The figure of 155 state signatories cannot increase because the LOS Conven-
tion is no longer open for signature.
23. As of October 15, 1986, the LOS Convention had 31 ratifications. No "ma-jor" power has ratified the Convention. China possibly will ratify in the near future, and
this may accelerate other ratifications.
24. Vignes, Les dclarationsfaites per les Etats Signataires de la convention des
Nations Unies sur le droit de le mer, sur la base de Particle 310 de cette convention, 29
ANNAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INT'L 715-48 (1983).
25. Id. at 719-35.
26. Id. at 719.
27. Id. at 720.
28. Id. at 721.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 723.
31. Id. at 723-26.
32. Id. at 726-29.
33. Id. at 729.
34. Id. at 720-32.
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nental shelf,35 delimitation with nearby uninhabited islands, 6 is-
lands, 37 enclosed and semi-enclosed seas,3 8 right of access for land-
locked states,39 the Area,40 the marine environment, 4 and general
provisions. 42 The discussion is interesting as it attempts to put the
article 309 and 310 'tandem' in perspective.43 Professor Vignes is
unsure about the exact future of these declarations. They will be
more important than travaux pr~paratoires and their use in future
litigation will clarify their nature.44
The approach taken here differs from that of Professor Vignes in
several important ways. First, almost four years after the signing
ceremony, far more state declarations and reactions to them are
available for analysis. Professor Vignes based his conclusions on the
declarations of twenty-seven states and now almost twice that many
are available. Second, while the specific referent of each declaration
is important, the focus here is on whether article 310 is being fol-
lowed: do the declarations "purport to exclude or to modify the legal
effect" of the Convention?45 The relatively small number of declara-
tions makes it desirable to focus on this one, central attribute. Fur-
ther, now that objections to declarations have begun to appear, it is
possible to gain another vantage point on the article 309 and 310
threshold.
Any analysis of these declarations shorter than book length must
try to describe the overall contours of the statements, focusing on a
few of them as either illustrative or noteworthy because they test the
declaration/reservation threshold. In first adopting this general ap-
proach, one has to decide what to count - a significant undertaking.
Setting aside the substance of the declaration, if a state has signed
the LOS Convention and offers a statement, presumably this consti-
tutes a declaration. But, how does one handle the noncomparability
of these declarations? For example, the United Republic of
Tanzania offered a thirty-two word statement expressing its choice
35. Id. at 732.
36. Id.




41. Id. at 734.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 717.
44. Id. at 735.
45. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 310.
for dispute settlement under the Convention.46 In stark contrast, the
Philippines submitted a far-reaching statement 47 that was judged by
many to be unacceptable.4 8 It seems that the most reasonable ap-
proach would count the Tanzanian statement as one declaration and
the Philippine as several, depending upon the number of distinct
points made. This procedure, which incidentally is similar to the
United Nation's reporting procedure, produced a total of 146 decla-
rations made by forty-three states. Two groups of statements have
been omitted from consideration here. First, those made by nonsig-
natories have been excluded. While these provide insight into state
policy positions, they are peripheral to a discussion of what consti-
tutes a reservation, if the state has not signed, let alone ratified, the
Convention. 49 Second, objections to other declarations also are omit-
ted. These are an important barometer of the legal and political
forces that ultimately determine the fate of the Convention - but
they are derivative of, and fundamentally different from,
declarations.
There are many possible categorizations of these declarations - it
is a pie that can be sliced in many different ways, each readily de-
fensible. But a prudent and conservative approach is to use the cate-
gories adopted by the United Nations." Figure 1 uses these catego-
ries and lists all states with declarations that apply.
46. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR
THE LAW OF THE SEA, 7 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 7 (1985) [hereinafter LOS BULLE-
TIN No. 7].
47. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR
THE LAW OF THE SEA, 5 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 18-19 (1985) [hereinafter LOS
BULLETIN No. 5].
48. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR
THE LAW OF THE SEA, STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA 41-46 (Aug. 1985).
49. Gamble & Frankowska, The Significance of Signature to the 1982 Montego
Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea, 14 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L.J. 129 (1984).
50. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at iv.
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General declarations (see the far left four columns in Figure 1)
are so named because they have applicability beyond specific provi-
sions of the LOS Convention. The first subcategory of these deals
with compatibility, usually between municipal law and the Conven-
tion. Compatibility can be harmless, as in the case of Cape Verde -
"[t]he provisions of the Convention . . . are compatible with the
fundamental objectives and aims that inspire the legislation of the
Republic of Cape Verde . . . .- In contrast, the declaration of the
Philippines creates many more difficulties:
The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes
do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic
State over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legisla-
tion to protect its sovereignty, independence, and security."2
It is apparent from many objections (some of which will be discussed
later) that many states feel that the Philippines went too far.
The second category of general declarations (indicated in column
2 of Figure 1) deals with statements intended not to prejudice the
position of a state. These can take many different forms. Some are
as benign as that of the German Democratic Republic, which stated
that it reserved the right to make declarations under article 310
when it ratified the Convention. At the opposite extreme is the
statement of Mali that its signature "has no effect on the course of
Mali's foreign policy or on the rights it derives from its sovereignty
under its Constitution or the Charter of the United Nations and any
other relevant rule of international law."15 4 It is entirely possible that
Mali will apply the LOS Convention in good faith, but such declara-
tions create unpleasant possibilities. One is tempted to ask: If the
Convention will have no effect on foreign policy, why should any
state become a party in the first place?
The third, and most numerous, subcategory of general declara-
tions concerns matters of recognition. Three different types of recog-
nition have been subsumed under one heading: recognition of states,
recognition of rights under the Convention, and nonrecognition of
territorial claims. In most cases, this category of declaration poses no
problems whatsoever for the integrity of the LOS Convention. Some
declarations in this group relate to territory - for example, Argen-
tina's claim to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands 5 and Spain's claim
51. Id. at 30.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 32.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 35.
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to Gibraltar.56 While certain of these territorial claims have clear
implications for hydrospace, one cannot imagine them seriously com-
promising the Convention. Other declarations are purely political:
Not surprisingly, many Arab-sympathizing states inserted a dis-
claimer that signing the LOS Convention does not imply recognition
of Israel.57
Interpretive Declarations
The largest group of declarations deals with the substantive arti-
cles of the LOS Convention - the United Nations calls these "inter-
pretative" declarations. In order to simplify Figure 1 somewhat, only
four subcategories are used: territorial sea and contiguous zone (17
statements); straits (11 statements); Exclusive Economic Zone (26
statements); and all other parts (23 statements). At first blush, this
may seem like a huge number of statements, but considering the 320
articles and 155 state signatories of the LOS Convention, it probably
is not excessive.
Many of the declarations directed toward the territorial sea ex-
press concern about innocent passage. Some of these statements, for
example, those by Finland and Cape Verde, do no more than assert
that their current laws and regulations conform with the LOS Con-
vention.58 Of course, the cynic might suggest that if current law was
completely and unambiguously consistent with the Convention, no
reason for the declaration would exist in the first place. In a few
instances, states go further, perhaps approaching the reservation
threshold:
The Yemen Arab Republic adheres to the concept of general international
law concerning free passage as applying exclusively to merchant ships and
aircraft; nuclear-powered craft, as well as warships and warplanes in gen-
eral, must obtain prior agreement from the Yemen Arab Republic before
passing through its territorial waters . . .
This declaration by Yemen might be regarded as an attempt to
upset the careful balance struck by the Convention. The terminology
"free passage" is almost irrelevant. The LOS Convention developed
intricate rules for innocent passage through the territorial sea.60 But
innocent passage is not free passage - it is assured passage provided
56. Id. at 36.
57. Id. at 34.
58. Id. at 39.
59. Id. at 40.
60. LOS Convention, supra note 6, arts. 17-32.
certain specified conditions are met.61 The conditions are rigorous,
but the intent is clear that all ships can exercise the right of innocent
passage if the stipulations are followed. By requiring prior agree-
ment, Yemen may be offering a reservation.
Eleven declarations concern passage through straits. These are
predictable, if a little disquieting. In almost all cases they seek to
assert special status or treatment for a strait on which a state bor-
ders. For example, Finland exempts itself from the transit passage
regime 2 on the grounds of LOS Convention article 35: "the legal
regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in part by
long-standing international conventions in force specifically relating
to such straits. '6 3
Sweden offered a completely parallel statement with respect to
straits bordering Denmark and Finland.64 Of all the declarations
dealing with straits, the one offered by the Philippines is the most
troubling: "[t]he concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the con-
cept of internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and
removes straits connecting these waters with the economic zone or
high seas from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for
international navigation. 6 5 In one fell swoop the Philippines upset a
delicate balance that took the Conference years to establish. Predict-
ably, many states have objected to the statement by the Philippines.
Twenty-six declarations deal with the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ). It is not surprising that this zone would have attracted atten-
tion, since it is one of the principal new creations of the Convention.
Several of these declarations (for example, those of Cape Verde,66
Chile,61 and Uruguay6 ) assert that the EEZ is a unique zone,
neither territorial sea nor high seas. This still may cause problems
for some states, but the matter seems of diminishing significance.
Maritime states especially would have preferred a formulation that
defined the EEZ as part of the high seas, possibly providing legal
inertia for those states so that residual or derivative rights in the
EEZ would be more difficult to claim. The LOS Convention itself
could have resolved the matter had it offered a precise definition of
high seas. Unfortunately, it did not:
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included
in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal wa-
ters of a State . . .This article does not entail any abridgment of the free-
61. Id. art. 19.
62. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at 41.63. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 35(c).
64. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at 43.
65. Id. at 42.
66. Id. at 43.
67. Id. at 44.
68. Id.
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dams enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone in accordance
with article 58.69
The language is an interesting bit of diplomatic dexterity. The high
seas provisions do not apply to the EEZ, but the text never states
explicitly that the EEZ is not part of the high seas. A sea by any
other name would navigate as freely!
Three declarations - those of Cape Verde,70 Italy,7' and Uru-
guay7 2 - deal directly with the matter of residual rights in the
EEZ. The positions of Cape Verde and Uruguay are virtually identi-
cal, stating that these rights reside with the coastal state "provided
that such regulation does not prevent the enjoyment of the freedom
of international communication which is recognized to other
States.173 Italy's position, on the other hand, is diametrically op-
posed: "the coastal State does not enjoy residual rights in the exclu-
sive economic zone."17 4
Four declarations pertain to artificial islands and installations in
the EEZ. 5 The positions presented here again diverge over the issue
of residual rights. Brazil,7 6 Cape Verde,77 and Uruguay" all main-
tain that coastal state authorization is required for any type of artifi-
cial installation. By contrast, Italy maintains that authorization is
limited "to the categories of such installations and structures as
listed in article 60 of the Convention. 17 9 The strong difference of
positions here creates grounds for additional claims and counter-
claims. But, in practical terms, the categories specified in article 60
are so broad that the consequences of the disagreement probably will
be minimal.
The other declarations concerning the EEZ deal with fisheries
rights. Most seem relatively minor, probably not challenging the dec-
laration/reservation threshold. The provisions of the LOS Conven-
tion are somewhat equivocal when specifying the obligations of
coastal states to permit other states to fish within their EEZs. For
example, after the coastal state determines that it cannot harvest the
69. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 86.
70. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at 45.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 46.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 45.
75. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 60.




total allowable catch in its EEZ, "it shall ...give other States ac-
cess to the surplus of the allowable catch . . . tak[ing] into account
all relevant factors." 80 The declarations are attempts to shade the
interpretation of the Convention provisions to suit the particular in-
terests of states. Cape Verde held that foreign states fishing within
an EEZ "are duty bound to enter into arrangements with the coastal
State.""'
Twenty-three additional declarations exist in the interpretative
declarations category. They are spread fairly evenly among the re-
maining parts of the LOS Convention. Most do not seem too signifi-
cant, save two exceptions. Iran makes an interesting point about is-
lands. Article 121 of the LOS Convention states that islands unable
to "sustain human habitation or economic life of their own" will not
have an economic zone or continental shelf.82 Iran's declaration
claims the right to use islands for boundary delimitation when those
islands "potentially can sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own, but due to climatic conditions, resources restriction or
other limitations, have not yet been put into development." 83 If a
state chooses to develop an island thus meeting the requirements of
article 121, it surely could use that island for measuring its zone.
But this kind of anticipatory use of uninhabited islands strains the
intent of the Convention.
Chile offered the other questionable declaration, expressing grave
concern about part XI of the Convention, the section dealing with
the international seabed regime. Chile asserts that the core of the
seabed regime is jus cogens. Hence, any activity pursued outside the
framework of the Convention would be "totally invalid and ille-
gal."'8 4 It is very difficult to prove that the seabed regime is part of
customary law.85 To attribute jus cogens status to it stretches the
point. Professor Sinclair's admonition seems to apply:
If it is invoked indiscriminately and to serve short-term political purposes, it
could rapidly be destructive of confidence in the security of treaties; if it is
developed with wisdom and restraint in the overall interest of the interna-
tional community it could constitute a useful check upon the unbridled will
of individual States.88
80. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 62.
81. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at 46.
82. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 121.3.
83. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at 50.
84. Id. at 54.
85. See Gamble & Frankowska, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law of
the Sea, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 509 (1984).
86. 1. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 131(1973).
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Other Declarations
Many of the remaining declarations (see Figure 1, the rightmost
two columns) pertain to dispute settlement. The issue of dispute set-
tlement provisions is somewhat parallel to that of reservations. Non-
binding dispute settlement provisions may increase participation
while weakening the integrity of the Convention; restrictive dispute
settlement provisions may have the opposite effect. The LOS Con-
vention took a middle position, setting out elaborate procedures but
providing parties with both the option to select among many dispute
settlement modes and, in some instances, the right to exclude certain
activities from dispute settlement.8s
The first group of declarations in this category is among the most
innocent offered in response to the LOS Convention. They say only
that the declaring state wishes to delay making any comment about
dispute settlement until some later time, often ratification of the
Convention.88 The balance of these statements, twenty-five in num-
ber, seems to stay completely within the letter and spirit of the LOS
Convention. States merely are exercising their rights under the Con-
vention to select certain dispute settlement procedures and, occasion-
ally, to exclude certain activities from the purview of compulsory dis-
pute settlement. The statement of the Soviet Union is typical of
many formulations:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that, under article 287 of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it chooses an arbi-
tral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII as the basic means
for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of
the Convention.8"
Almost identical declarations were made by the German Democratic
Republic,9" the Ukrainian S.S.R.91 and the Byelorussian Soviet So-
cialist Republic.92
A relatively small group of declarations remains that deserves spe-
cial attention, usually because these declarations may exclude or
modify the legal effect of the Convention. This group is highly va-
ried, falls into many of the aforementioned categories, and defies
facile description. The first of these was put forth by Angola and
falls under the "non-prejudice of future position" category. Angola
87. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at 56.
88. LOS Convention, supra note 6, arts. 279-99.
89. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at 59.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 60.
desires to retain the right "to interpret any and all articles of the
Convention in the context of and with due regard to Angolan Sover-
eignty and territorial integrity . . ,,11 Guinea offered a very simi-
lar statement. 4 It is impossible to predict how these provisions might
be used, but they carry the potential for abuse of the Convention.
One of the more surprising declarations was made by Egypt. Al-
though the EEZ was designed to be distinct from the continental
shelf, the Egyptian declaration seeks to claim continental shelf re-
sources via the EEZ concept: "Egypt will also exercise its sovereign
rights in this zone for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, con-
serving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-
living, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters
. . "95 The stand taken by Egypt is defensible because of the
broad scope of the EEZ provisions. But it does seem to represent a
loose interpretation of the Convention that, if adopted by other states
in other contexts, could be serious.
France introduced a declaration that may be troubling principally
because of its sweeping character:
The provisions of the Convention relating to the status of the different mari-
time spaces . . . confirm and consolidate the general rules of the law of the
sea and thus entitle the French Republic not to recognize as enforceable
against it any foreign laws or regulations that are not in conformity with
those general rules.96
This may be nothing more than an attempt by France to protect
itself from unreasonable claims from other states. It has the poten-
tial, however, under the massive umbrella of "general rules of the
law of the sea," to circumvent provisions of the LOS Convention.
So far, relatively few objections to declarations have been made,
indicating that article 310 is working - one would assume that an
objection is offered only when the objecting state considers the target
statement to be a reservation, not merely a declaration. Most of the
objections come from the Soviet Union and East European states.9 7
They usually make a general statement about abuse of article 310.
For example, Bulgaria "is seriously concerned by the actions of a
number of States which . . . have made reservations . "..."98
Czechoslovakia does not seem quite so concerned, believing that
"certain States" have made reservations.99 The Soviet Union's objec-
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. ST/
LEG./SER.e/4, at 707 (1986) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].
96. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at 11.
97. Id. at 41-43.
98. LOS BULLETIN No.7, supra note 46, at 7.
99. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 95, at 717.
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tion assesses the overall magnitude of reservations. 100 It elaborates in
some detail its objections to the Philippine declaration:
The discrepancy between the Philippine statement and the Convention can
be seen . . . from the affirmation by the Philippines that 'the concept of
archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the
Constitution of the Philippines . . . [The Government of the Philippines in
its] statement emphasizes more than once that, despite its ratification of the
Convention, the Philippines will continue to be guided in matters relating to
the sea, not by the Convention and the obligations under it, but by its do-
mestic law and by agreements, it has already concluded which are not in
line with the Convention. 01
Almost identical sentiments were expressed by Bulgaria 10 2 and
Czechoslovakia. 10 3
It is possible to speculate about why the Philippines was the target
of so many objections. Little doubt remains that the Philippines' dec-
laration goes a long way to challenge the archipelagic waters' pro-
visions of the LOS Convention. But other declarations, while perhaps
less specific, seem to offer a comparable challenge. 0 5 Apparently,
reaction to the Philippine position was intensified by (1) the size and
location of the Philippine archipelago, and (2) the political posture
of the Marcos government. The first of these factors is immutable; it
remains to be seen whether the second will change with the Aquino
government in Manila.
The only other objections listed by the United Nations were made
- by Ecuador, 08 Israel,'0 7 and Venezuela. 0 8 Perhaps these should not
be discussed in this category, since none of these three states signed
the LOS Convention. Ecuador wishes to reassert it claims to a 200-
mile territorial sea.'09 Israel and Venezuela wish to be certain that
no additional meaning is read into their signing of the Final Act of
the Conference."10
100. Id. at 718-19.
101. Id.
102. LOS BULLETIN No. 7, supra note 46, at 7.
103. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 95, at 717.
104. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 45-46.
105. Chile, for example. LOS BULLETIN No. 5, supra note 47, at 54.






It is imperative to remember that this Article can be considered
nothing more than an interim assessment of the operation of articles
309 and 310. The LOS Convention is only half way to entry into
force. Clearly, many more declarations will be made. Further, as
more states ratify the Convention, it will be possible to test the dura-
bility of declarations that were made at signature and evaluate
whether they will be repeated, revised, or dropped at ratification.
So far, the only supportable conclusion is that article 310 appears
to be working fairly well. Certain declarations probably do cross the
reservations threshold, the most notable being that of the Philip-
pines, but these are rare exceptions. At least half of the declarations
are totally harmless. Most of the others are so vague that their effect
is impossible to determine, or so narrowly or peripherally focused
that they will have little impact on the operation of the LOS
Convention.
It now is possible to offer a few more observations about the mat-
ter of participation levels raised earlier in this work. If the impact of
the LOS Convention is to be sustained, the Convention must enter
into force. The Convention now has about half of the sixty ratifica-
tions required for force.111 Let us compare two sets of figures. There
were 155 state signatures to the LOS Convention, of which thirty-
one (20%) have ratified the Convention." 2 Forty-three states offered
some sort of a declaration, nine (21%) of which have ratified. Is the
glass half empty or half full? One explanation is that because decla-
rations are still permitted, this group of states is as likely to ratify as
those which felt no need to make declarations. From the other van-
tage point, the declarations offered so far have made these states no
more likely to become party to the LOS Convention.
Although a final assessment cannot be made for some years, arti-
cle 310 seems to be working. The Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea departed radically from existing practice by
completely prohibiting all reservations. In general, states seem to be
following the provisions. Most have offered no declarations. A total
of forty-three states have made declarations. Most pose no problem
whatsoever. Only about a dozen (from a total of 146 statements)
arguably might constitute reservations. The exact disposition of these
will depend on the continued operation of the declaration/objection
process and, in some cases, court tests.
111. LOS Convention, supra note 6, art. 308.
112. Current information [Oct. 15, 1986] kindly provided by the Treaty Section,
UN Office of Legal Affairs [current information on file with the San Diego Law
Review].
